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abstract 
While torture and assassination have not infrequently been used by states, the post 9/11 "war on 
terror" waged by the U.S. has been distinguished by the open acknowledgement of, and political 
and legal justifications put forward in support of, these practices.  This is surprising insofar as the 
primary theories that have been mobilized by sociologists and political scientists to understand 
the relation between the spread of human rights norms and state action presume that states will 
increasingly adhere to such norms in their rhetoric, if not always in practice.  Thus, while it is not 
inconceivable that the U.S. would engage in torture and assassination, we would expect these 
acts would be conducted under a cloak of deniability.  Yet rather than pure hypocrisy, the U.S. 
war on terror has been characterized by the development of a legal infrastructure to support the 
use of "forbidden" practices such as torture and assassination, along with varying degrees of 
open defense of such tactics.  Drawing on first-order accounts presented in published memoirs, 
this paper argues that the Bush administration developed such openness as a purposeful strategy, 
in response to the rise of a legal, technological, and institutional transnational human rights 
infrastructure which had turned deniability into a less sustainable option.  It concludes by 
suggesting that a more robust theory of state action, drawing on sociological field theory, can 
help better explain the ways that transnational norms and institutions affect states. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, June 
2014, and at a workshop on "Fielding Transnationalism" at Boston University, October 2014.  Thanks for Monika 
Krause and Julian Go, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for comments. 
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The lawyers' war: legalizing torture in the war on terror  
"In the aftermath of 9/11, the White House went beyond the CIA's highly secretive practice of 
torture during the Cold War to its open, even defiant use of coercive interrogation as a formal 
weapon of the arsenal of American power-- a historic shift with profound implications for this 
nation's international standing" (McCoy 2006:211) 
"Many people think the Bush administration has been indifferent to wartime legal constraints.  
But the opposite is true: the administration has been strangled by law, and since September 11, 
2001, this war has been lawyered to death." (Goldsmith 2007:68-69) 
Introduction 
 After 9/11, American officials developed an explicit legal framework to support the use 
of practices such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and physical confinement-- practices that, 
when used by other nations, have generally been understood as torture.  While the practice of 
torture itself is neither rare nor fully unexpected in times of "terror" and heightened security 
threats, both the literature on states and human rights violations, and the recent history of state 
use of torture, would lead us to expect that any such use of torture, especially by states 
identifying as Western, advanced, and democratic, would be cloaked within an apparatus of 
secrecy and denial.   Yet in the post-9/11 war on terror, not only did state agents engage in 
torture, officials developed both political and legal justifications for the practice.  Furthermore, 
these justifications cannot be understood as merely post hoc attempts to save face, as they were 
developed both before and after the use of torture became widely known.   
 This paper thus asks: why construct an explicit legal architecture for practices which, 
until recently, if engaged in at all, would have been subject to the highest levels of secrecy, and 
certainly not documented by lawyers?  It further asks, how can we square this development with 
the spread of human rights norms over the course of the 20th century?  The key puzzle is thus 
not merely why did the U.S. government make use of torture in the aftermath of 9/11, but why it 
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did so in a relatively open fashion.2  The conduct of the American state in engaging in practices 
of torture and "enhanced interrogation" was, if not necessarily predictable, certainly 
comprehensible in light of 9/11 and the apparatus of "terrorism" through which Americans made 
sense of the attacks.  Nor can the adoption of these practices after 9/11 be seen as completely 
surprising, given the history of their use throughout the 20th century.3  But why not proceed in 
clandestine fashion?  And why has the war on terror, and particularly the use of torture and 
assassination, been so saturated with legal expertise?  In sum, why bother developing an explicit 
justifications for practices that, in the past, would have simply been undertaken covertly? 
 I argue that we can best understand the open defense of torture and assassination as 
a response to the rise of a transnational field of legal regulation of human rights that sought to 
encompass both states and individual state officials.4  In other words, the appearance of explicit 
legal justification of human rights violations, at the very moment when they the international 
human rights field seems to have attained its peak,  should not be seen a paradox, but rather as 
two interrelated developments.  I develop support for this argument by drawing on the accounts 
of these events presented in memoirs of direct participants, treating these as primary sources. 
                                                          
2
 When I speak of "openness" here, I do not mean to imply that there was a complete turnaround from total secrecy 
about government use of torture and other "forbidden practices" to absolute transparency.  Rather, the status of such 
practices in the war on terror is best characterized as "quasi-open" --- a status that encompassed at times quite 
complete transparency, at times denial, and at much of the time, rested on a strategy of creating and mobilizing legal 
and linguistic ambiguity as to whether the practices in question actually did constitute "torture."   This openness, 
whether full or partial, is puzzling because it appears, as the dramatic reversal of a norm that had been growing ever 
stronger over the second half of the twentieth century.  
3
 Perhaps most notoriously at the "School of the Americas" where the CIA trained Latin American paramilitary 
squads in the arts of torture and disappearance. 
4
 While there is also an important domestic legal and human rights field which has been important here, this paper 
focuses on the role of the transnational human rights field.  A fuller analysis elsewhere will be needed to tease out 
the distinct roles of domestic vs. international law in constraining the state and its use of violence.  For purposes of 
this article, the focus will remain on the effects of the transnational field, presuming that developments towards the 
legalization/ legal constraint on use of force within the domestic field can, in this instance, be understood to be in 
large part responses to the rise of such legal constraints in the transnational arena, and thus should largely be 
understood as mediating the relation between the transnational field and the state. 
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 The "legalization" of torture presents a circumstance not predicted or conceptualized by 
the primary theories mobilized in sociology and political science to understand how human 
rights norms affect states.  These tend to suggest that we will observe an increasing adherence to 
such norms, at least at the level of states' rhetoric, if not always in their practices.  The general 
expectation has been that states will increasingly move in the direction of greater respect for 
human rights, and that even when states commit violations of human rights, they will still affirm 
the respect for human rights treaties and norms at the level of rhetoric and ideals.  Within this 
framework, the actions of the U.S. in the war on terror seem almost inexplicable.   
 One might argue that this is simply a case of American exceptionalism (e.g. Mertus 
2008:17), or that the U.S., as the globally hegemonic power, is not subject to the rules shaping 
the conduct of other states.  In the view of this paper, however, these explanations are 
inadequate, because the quasi-open breaking of the torture taboo is not a unique event, even in 
the contemporary era of the human rights regime.  There have been similar transformations  
elsewhere; perhaps most notably the Israeli "Landau Commission" of the 1980s which ruled on 
the legality of torture.  And earlier in the century, albeit before the adoption of the UN 
Convention Against Torture, both France and the UK attempted to legalize the use of torture.  In 
France, the 1955 Wuillame report "called for the 'veil of hypocrisy' to be lifted and for 'safe and 
controlled' interrogation techniques to be authorized" (Bellamy 2006:128) in Algeria, while in 
Britain, the 1971 Compton Commission to investigate claims of state torture in Northern Ireland 
heard similar claims (Bellamy 2006).  Furthermore, the claim to American exceptionalism is also 
belied by the fact that the U.S. did, in fact, until quite recently, hold to international human rights 
norms, at least rhetorically, if not always in practice.   
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 Others have suggested that the actions of the Bush administration should be seen as a 
temporary aberration.  But while the Obama administration has stepped back from its 
predecessor's justifications of torture, the larger pattern of open justification, and legal-ization of 
violations of international law has continued (Hajjar 2010). Furthermore, although the signature 
practice of the war on terror under Obama has shifted from torture and indefinite detention to 
"targeted killing," the U.S. remains engaged in a practice forbidden under both domestic and 
international law, and yet openly defended in political rhetoric and legal-ized. 
 A third possible explanation arises from the literature theorizing the U.S. after 9.11 as 
exemplifying a "state of exception" (van Munster 2004, Agamben 2005, Aradau and van 
Munster 2009).  This approach suggests that under conditions of emergency, the state declares 
itself outside, or not subject to, the law (in this case, the international laws of war and human 
rights), thus enabling a wider range of action.  This interpretation is echoed by those critics who 
have cast the prison at Guantanamo, and sometimes the "war on terror" as a whole, as a "legal 
black hole":5 a space wholly outside the law.  But while it is true that many analyses of the role 
of law in the post 9/11 war on terror have focused upon the ways in which the Bush 
administration violated, or seemed to ignore, the law, my focus here is the opposite, the central 
role played by lawyers in these very developments.  Recent American counterterrorism policy 
has been thoroughly imbued with concern for the law, and lawyers and legal experts have been 
among the most prominent actors in the shaping of these policies (and their subsequent 
contestation).     
                                                          
5
 "Legal black hole" is often attributed to (Steyn 2004), although the term has come into increasingly common use, 
particularly among critics from the legal profession. 
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 Instead, this paper develops a framework for explaining the legal justification of torture 
as a strategic response to structural shifts in the transnational arena.  It argues that American state 
actors found themselves in a new strategic position as a result of the rise of a transnational field 
of human rights advocacy.   This new field, which developed and grew in strength over the 
course of the twentieth century, was composed of individuals and organizations that sought to 
enact new human rights norms that would constrain states.  Through key practices, including the 
enactment of international laws to protect human rights, the collection, verification, and 
publication of evidence of human rights violations, and the prosecution of individual state actors 
for violations, these actors sought to reduce the presence of torture and other violations in the 
world.  Yet one unintended, and likely unforeseen, consequence of these developments was to 
shift the strategic context within which states acted.   While the rise of the human rights field 
may have shifted the calculus made by states as to whether to violate or respect human rights,6 a 
surely unintended consequence was that it also shifted the context within which states that made 
the decision to engage in violations would act.  I argue that such states now find themselves in a 
context in which the decision to encompass torture within an apparatus of secrecy and denial is 
less obvious than it was before, and in which the possible choice to openly acknowledge and 
legally justify such practices becomes more thinkable than before. 
 This argument draws upon the sociological framework of field theory (Bourdieu 1977, 
1990), which has the key advantage of enabling researchers to analyze the movements of actors 
and social structures together.  While field theory has most often been used to analyze action at 
the level of the individual, and within states this paper builds on a recent move to apply field 
theory at the transnational level, and to state and other collective actors (e.g.Go 2008, Mudge and 
                                                          
6
 As I discuss below, the evidence on this question is uncertain. 
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Vauchez 2012).  This field approach allows us to conceptualize not only how transnational actors 
and movements might not only try to constrain states, but to re-conceptualize the transnational 
arena as a space within which states may also "act back" upon these constraints and aim to 
change the so-called "rules of the game" in response.  
Methods/data 
 To support the argument that the "legalization" of torture was a purposeful strategy 
enacted in response to the rise of human rights norms and the overall "legalization" of warfare, I 
draw on first-person accounts of those who enacted these policies, in the form of published 
memoirs.  In studying events which are not available through the release of archival records, and, 
whose participants are not all likely to be accessible for direct interviews, memoirs can function 
as a suitable proxy, providing first-hand accounts, in their own words, of those who developed 
these policies.  While memoirs are but one possible source where one might look for first-hand 
accounts of those involved in the decision to "legalize" torture, I have chosen to focus on the 
accounts found in memoirs rather than in alternate sources such as published interviews, or the 
"torture memos" and accompanying documents themselves, first, because these are the sources 
where individuals put forth their accounts for posterity, and second, because they are a presently-
underutilized source.7   
 Memoirs are a complex and potentially problematic source of data.   Gocek (2015)'s 
historical study of the denial of Turkish violence against the Armenians, which relies on 
memoirs as its primary source, contains a thoughtful discussion of the advantages and limitations 
of such a data source, highlighting that memoirs will limit one to the voices of the relatively 
                                                          
7
 This paper is part of an ongoing, larger research project, which will be engaging with all of these sources. 
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elite, and the challenge posed by the difficulty in how to "differentiate fact from fiction, 
knowledge based on sources from rhetoric, and historical events from their mythified 
recollections" (Gocek 2015:xxi).  In the case of the present study, however, the focus on elites is 
a purposeful feature of the study, and while the difficulty of separating "fact from fiction" is still 
a concern, the fact that this study is focused on interpretations themselves makes memoirs an 
appropriate source.  I take memoirs as a proxy form of ethnographic data, or self reporting on the 
events in question.  They are not to be taken as pure fact/ transparent reporting of the events that 
occurred, but rather, taken as  a source of the individuals' framings and justification of the events 
as they went down- which is exactly why memoirs are useful/ appropriate sources for this 
investigation.   A list of the memoirs analyzed is included as an appendix to the paper. 
Theorizing "human rights" and how international "norms" affect states 
   With the rise of human rights, there has been a corresponding rise of studies of human 
rights.  Much of this literature has focused on analyzing the effects of these norms, laws, and 
institutions, with the question usually posed as, do these norms and laws have effects upon the 
actual occurrence of torture? (e.g. (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer , Cole 2012, Hafner-
Burton 2013, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2013, Fariss 2014)).8  However, such studies have 
come to no agreement on this question, with some studies even finding a negative correlation 
between the spread of treaties and states' adherence to norms of human rights!  Rather than 
assuming that these contradictory findings are the result of errors in measurement or ambiguities 
                                                          
8
 There is also a significant literature tracing the rise of human rights "norms" and the institutionalization of human 
rights in laws, treaties, and international institutions (e.g.(Keck and Sikkink 1998, Clark 2001, Dezalay and Garth 
2006, Levy and Sznaider 2006, Borgwardt 2007, Hunt 2007, Burke 2010, Sikkink 2011, Moyn 2012b, a, Brysk 
2013, Joas 2013, Keys 2014)), but as this paper is concerned more with the response to human rights, I will mention 
these only briefly. 
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in operationalization, I propose that these "untidy" results should prompt those who wish to 
understand the effects of the new "human rights regime" to look in an alternate direction.  
 In more general form, this is the question of how international norms and international 
laws affect states.  The extant literature is dominated by two theoretical frameworks, 
international relations theory (including both realist and constructivist variants), and sociological 
"world-society" theory.  A key weakness of realist IR theories is their inability to grapple with 
the power of culture.  Constructivist IR theories, on the other hand, give culture central 
significance, but tend to lack a developed theory of exactly how culture has influence, 
particularly over relatively powerful states, or under what circumstances states might be able to 
resist cultural norms.   
 World-society theory has been a key theoretical approach for much of the sociological 
work on states and human rights.   For example, Meyer et. al. trace "the rise of human rights 
themes in secondary school social science textbooks around the world since 1970," finding 
support for "WKHDUJXPHQWVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOWKHRULHVWKDWWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\³JOREDOL]HG´ZRUOGLV
one in which the standing of the participatory and empowered individual person has very great 
legitimacy" (Meyer, Bromley and Ramirez 2010:111), while Levy and Sznaider examine " how 
global interdependencies and the consolidation of a human rights discourse are transforming 
national sovereignty" given that "adherence to global human rights norms confers legitimacy" 
(Levy, et al. 2006:657).  The key weaknesses of the "world-society" approach is that it tends to 
assume that all states will eventually (and consensually) shift towards an agreed upon set of 
norms and practices, and further, it tends to assume that norms will diffuse outward from more 
powerful to less powerful states (Go 2008).  There is thus little room in such a theoretical 
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framework for reactive shifts, away from a norm, particularly when such shifts are taken by a 
powerful state.9  
 The dominant conceptualizations of relations between state discourse and practices on 
human rights presume, first, that only certain alignments are likely: those which I have labeled in 
the table below as 1 (hypocrisy), 2A (barbarism10), and 3 (enlightenment), and yet misses out on 
others (2B: brazenness).11  Further, this literature presumes a narrative teleology; it presumes that 
states will progress in only in one direction, "forward."   The unspoken teleology of this literature 
is that the effect of the human rights field (norms, treaties, laws, and beliefs) upon states will be 
to move them from status 2A (barbarism, in which they fail to acknowledge the value of human 
rights either in rhetoric or in practice) towards status 3 (enlightenment) in which they affirm the 
value of human rights both rhetorically in practice, or at the very least, towards status 1 
(hypocrisy) in which states affirm the value of human rights in discourse but not in practice.  The 
trajectory which this paper observes in the U.S. war on terror, from status 1 or 3 back, to box 2, 
is not conceptualized as a possibility.   
Table 1: states and human rights 
 States rhetorically affirm value 
of human rights 
States fail to affirm (or actively 
deny) value of human rights12 
State practices violate human 
rights 
1. "hypocrisy"  2A. "barbarism" 
2B. "brazenness" 
                                                          
9
 Although see (Shor 2008) for an attempt to resolve some of these difficulties. 
10
 I purposely use the loaded term "barbarism" here in recognition of the fact that the discourse of human rights 
presumes a "civilizing" trajectory from rhetoric and action that are less to more "enlightened". 
11
 These categories were developed inductively in response to the frameworks used in most existing studies of the 
effects of human rights norms, although the names for the categories are my own. 
12
 There is, of course, a further complication here, which is that the Bush administration, during the state I am 
calling "brazenness" simultaneously affirmed the value of "human rights" and openly affirmed the necessity of 
violations of human rights; contradictions that cannot be fully explored within the scope of this paper, but which will 
be analyzed in future research. 
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State practice respect human 
rights 
3. "enlightenment" 4. "naivete" 
 
 Rather than presuming that the rise of the "human rights regime" has its most significant 
effect upon concrete violations of human rights themselves, I argue that they may instead have 
their most significant effects upon what I refer to as states' "strategies" towards the protection 
and/or violation of human rights.  I suggest that the Bush administration turned to the strategy of 
"brazenness" not because they were oblivious to the rise of the international human rights field, 
but rather, as a conscious strategic response to it.13   By using the term "strategy" here, I intend to 
encompass not just states' violations (or positive protections) of human rights, but also the ways 
in which a state negotiates, frames, and defends these actions in both its domestic and its 
international political contexts.14   In other words, extant studies of human rights have been 
missing out on a significant effect of human rights "culture/discourse" upon states, because they 
have a relatively constrained conceptualization of "practices."  This is different from arguments 
suggesting that states' "speech" about human rights, and their concrete "practices" of respect or 
violation are disjointed --- i.e. that there is no necessary connection between the two, although it 
is generally assumed that, since "talk is cheap," the usual pattern will be either for states to affirm 
their respect for human rights rhetorically yet violate them in practice, or to respect human rights 
both in speech and in practice. My argument instead is that the line of effect from norms to 
                                                          
13
 Katherine Sikkink makes a similar argument in her recent book, The Justice Cascade (Sikkink 2011), writing that,  
while at first:  "I assumed that U.S. officials could not have fully understood the implications of the justice cascade, 
because if they had fully understood, they wouldn't have adopted policies that were criminal under both U.S. and 
international law.  .  .  I now believe that the very production of these memos was a response to the rise in national 
and international human rights prosecutions.  .  . the memos themselves are indications , however perverse, of the 
impact of the justice cascade" (Sikkink 190-92).  However Sikkink only develops this argument briefly in the form 
of a speculative explanation, whereas this paper develops the theory more fully and draws on evidence to support it. 
 
14
 I use the term "strategy" here in the Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 1977). 
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action is not so direct.  Rather than assuming that the norm of respect for human rights is settled, 
second, that norms exert a fairly strong and unilateral power upon the speech of both states and 
publics (i.e., that once the norm of respect for human rights is settled, actors will necessarily at 
least give lip service to it); and third, that norms also exert a fairly unilateral, yet somewhat 
weaker, force upon the actions of states (that is, whether or not they will actually violate or 
respect the human rights of those under their domain), I argue that we need to think about how 
practices, norms, and speech interact in more complex ways, and in which both the affirmation 
of the norm against torture and the rejection or redefinition of such norms can be seen as 
strategic.   
From denial to justification: American torture after 9/11 
 By the end of the twentieth century, not only had the right not to be tortured become a 
well established norm, but open support for torture had become almost unspeakable, if not 
unthinkable. It seemed that respect for human rights had become something almost universally 
adhered to in rhetoric, if not always in practice.  As philosopher Henry Shue wrote in his classic 
essay oIµ1RRWKHUSUDFWLFHH[FHSWVODYHU\LVVRXQLYHUVDOO\DQGXQDQLPRXVO\FRQGHPned 
in law and human convention´(Shue, p 47, in (Levinson 2004)), while more recently, Rosemary 
)RRWGHFODUHGWKDW³:KLOHWKHSUDFWLFHRIWRUWXUHKDVEHHQZLGHVSUHDGXQWLOUHFHQWO\LWKDGFRPH
to be understood that no representatives of the state could openly admit that they would use 
torture for fear of being removed from office and of having their state osWUDFL]HGE\µFLYLOL]HG¶
nations" (Foot 2006:131).  In America's 1999 report to the UN committee against torture, the US 
government stated clearly and emphatically that,  
 torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States.  It is categorically denounced 
 as a matter of policy and as a tool of state authority. Every act constituting torture under 
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 the Convention constitutes a criminal offense under the law of the United States.  No 
 official of the government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized to 
 commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture.  Nor may any official condone or 
 tolerate torture in any form.  No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a 
 justification of torture. 
Katherine Sikkink quotes this passage at length, noting that, "there was little ambiguity in US 
legal and ethical commitments to the prohibition on torture and cruel and unusual punishment 
prior to 2002" (Sikkink 2011:196-7). 
 In sum, while one may doubt the sincerity of such statements--that is, whether states were 
actually abiding by the moral platitudes which they officially endorsed, it appeared to be a matter 
of little contention that states should and would endorse human rights, and particularly, the right 
not to be tortured, at least in principle.  By the end of the 20th century, opposition to torture had, 
in the U.S. and elsewhere, attained the status of what social scientists sometimes refer to as a 
norm-- a settled, institutionalized, moral position.  Some have even argued that the problem of 
torture had attained the status of a sacred boundary which might not be crossed.15 
 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the legal and moral permissibility 
of torture seemed to suddenly take on the status of an open question.  Debate erupted in the 
public sphere, as well as within the government, over the both efficacy, and the legal and ethical 
permissibility, of torture.  Popular magazines such as Newsweek, The Atlantic, and The 
Economist published cover stories arguing for and against, and a number of prominent 
philosophers and lawyers came out publicly in favor of the permissibility of torture, and its 
                                                          
15
 e.g. (Ignatieff 2003) 
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legalization.  Newspapers reported that FBI counterterrorism agents were "frustrated" and 
considering the use of "pressure" or "harsh interrogations."  The New York Times would write 
that had become a topic of conversation µLQEDUVRQFRPPXWHUWUDLQVDQGDWGLQQHUWDEOHV´16 
 Another writer notes that, "(e)arnest public discussion of the pros and cons of torture 
gained momentum in the United States shortly after the 9/11 attacks.  .  .  and continued to unfold 
until, and beyond, the May 2004 publication of the first photographs from Abu Ghraib" (Hannah 
2006:624).  On December 26, 2002 the Washington Post ran a front-page story on allegations of 
torture and inhumane treatment.  They quote officials as saying, "If you don't violate someone's 
human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job," and, "We don't kick the 
[expletive] out of them...We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of 
then"(cited in (Press 2003)). 
 Meanwhile, public opinion surveys began to suggest that opposition to torture was on the 
wane.  A November 2001, survey found that that 32% of Americans favored torturing terror 
suspects, while lawyer Alan Dershowitz, one of the key proponents of the legalization of torture, 
UHSRUWHGWKDWµ>G@XULQJQXPHURXVSXEOLFDSSHDUDQFHVVLQFH6HSWHPEHU,KDYHDVNHG
audiences for a show of hands as to how many would support the use of nonlethal torture in a 
ticking bomb case.  Virtually every hand is raised.´17  1RZRIFRXUVHZHGRQ¶WNQRZZKDW
proportion of Americans would have favored torturing terror suspects before 9/11--- because no 
one was asking, which is the point:  the question was virtually unspeakable.  Furthermore, this 
                                                          
16
 ³$VHDUO\DV2FWREHUD:DVKLQJWRn Post article reported FBI agents outlining their frustrations over the 
refusal of suspects to provide information and suggesting they might have to use pressure to get those details.  On 5 
1RYHPEHUD1HZVZHHNDUWLFOHDSSHDUHGHQWLWOHGµ7LPHWR7KLQN$ERXW7RUWXUH¶  In January 2003, The 
(FRQRPLVWSXEOLVKHGDFRYHUVWRU\HQWLWOHGµ,V7RUWXUH(YHU-XVWLILHG"´)RRW ³6L[ZHHNVDIWHU
September 11, news articles reported that frustrated FBI interrogators were considering harsh interrogation tactics, 
DQGWKH1HZ<RUN7LPHVUHSRUWHGWKDWWRUWXUHKDGEHFRPHDWRSLFRIFRQYHUVDWLRQµLQEDUVRQFRPPXWHUWUDLQVDQG
DWGLQQHUWDEOHV¶´/XEDQLQ*UHHQEHUJ 
17
 (cited in Luban, in Greenberg: 35) 
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shift in favor of relatively open debate over the permissibility of torture, including affirmations 
of its use, cannot be understood as simply a matter of post hoc justification, for it developed 
alongside, and in some cases prior to, the shift in concrete practices, rather than simply in 
response to it.  Even before the revelations that the U.S. was, in fact, torturing prisoners in the 
war on terror18 the question of whether or not we should torture terrorist suspects came to occupy 
a key role in public discourse.   
 After 9/11, lawyers were enrolled in interpreting the law so as to give the president as 
much leeway as possible in working unilaterally, often explicitly against the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the law enshrined in international treaties such as the Geneva accords.  Legal expertise 
was used to delineate the boundaries of exceptional treatment that could be used in a preemptive 
approach to counterterrorism.   For example, Pfiffner (2010) identifies three key policy decisions 
on the use of torture, each of which supported by legal expertise:  the first, President Bush's 
Military Order of November 13, 2001, "which authorized military commissions, defined enemy 
combatants, and set the conditions of their imprisonment", the second, the suspension of the 
Geneva Agreements, ordered by   President Bush on February 7, 2002, and the third Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld's decision of December 2, 2002 that "allowed military interrogators to use 
techniques that were not allowed by the Army Field Manual on interrogation" (Pfiffner 2010:14).  
&ULWLFDOJHRJUDSKHU'HUHN*UHJRU\DUJXHVWKDWZKLOHWKH³YHU\ODQJXDJHRIH[WUDRUGLQDU\ 
rendition, ghost prisoners, and black sites implies something out of the ordinary, spectral, a 
twilight zone: a serial space of exception.  .  . this performative spacing works through the law to 
annul the law: it is not a state of exception that can be counterpoised to a rule governed world of 
normal politics.  . .  it is a, at bottomDSURFHVVRIMXULGLFDORWKHULQJ´ (Gregory and Pred 
                                                          
18Most notably through the release of photos from the notorious Abu Ghraib prison in 2004. 
lawyers' war 16 
 
2007:226).  Similarly, Fleur Johns has wULWWHQWKDW³WKHSOLJKWRIWKH*uantanamo detainees is 
OHVVDQRXWFRPHRIODZ¶VVXVSHQVLRQRUHYLVFHUDWLRQWKDQRIHODERUDWHUHJXODWRU\HIIRUWVE\D
range of legal authority.  The detention camps are above all works of legal representation and 
classification.  They are spaces where law and liberal proceduralism speak and operate in 
H[FHVV´19  Similar arguments regarding the very centrality of law have also been made by  
Khalili (2008), Dayan (2011), and Hajjar (2011). 
 The final extent of openness around torture is illustrated by the fact that state officials 
defended the use of torture even after the practice had become a public scandal.  The story of 
torture at Abu Ghraib prison began to break in late 2003, and in April 2004 photos depicting 
abuse of prisoners were published in the Washington Post and by the television show 60 minutes.  
In May of that year,  a previously internal Red Cross report on conditions at the prison was 
leaked to the Wall Street journal.  While the scandal following the release of shocking explicit 
photographs from now- notorious Iraqi prison, did lead to a resurgence of condemnation, more 
recent surveys have actually found that that increasing percentages of Americans now profess 
support for torture under certain circumstances.20  And even more puzzlingly, while the scandal 
was followed at first by the expected denials, the resolution took the form of overt approvals of 
torture (even if not always labeled as such).  While the reaction we might expect would have 
been, "first, an absolutely unambiguous cessation of questionable interrogation practices by the 
administration; and second, a major domestic political upheaval in which broad swaths of the 
American public loudly insist that anything smacking of torture stop immediately and that top-
level officials on whose watch earlier abuses occurred be thrown out of office," neither the 
                                                          
19
 Fleur Johns "Guantanamo Bay and the annihilation of the exception"  European Journal of International Law 16 
(2005) p613-:614, cited in Gregory (2007). 
20
 (Zegart 2012, Brooks and Manza 2013) 
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"unambiguous cessation" of torture, nor the broad "political upheaval" occurred (Hannah 
2006:622).  Exposure did not put an end to the practice of torture, nor did it lead to a clear moral 
and political condemnation of those who had authorized and carried it out. Instead, ³>W@KHV\VWHP
of torture has VXUYLYHGLWVGLVFORVXUH´21  
 The Bush administration at first engaged in a strategy of denial, claiming that the photos 
from Abu Ghraib reflected only the work of a few "bad apples."  Yet, as time went by, the 
administration turned to policies that would allow the continued use of the techniques exposed, 
and open defense of "harsh interrogation", their euphemism for torture.  When Congress sought 
to reign in the use of torture, as in the McCain amendment, which would ban the use of torture 
on any detainees in U.S. custody, "Vice President Cheney and CIA director Porter Goss publicly 
urged Congress to exempt the CIA" (Mertus 2008:74-5).  And when the amendment passed 
regardless, "The administration did little to alleviate suspicions when President Bush attached a 
'signing statement' to the amendment, declaring that the president had the right at any point not to 
comply with the ban on cruel, inhumane, and degrading punishment" (Mertus 2008:75).  When 
the Army released a new field manual in September 2006, which reaffirmed the need to adhere 
to the Geneva Conventions and barring torture, President Bush asserted that the new regulations 
would not apply to the CIA: "In a speech that sharply contrasted with the Pentagon speech in 
both tone and substance, President Bush confirmed the existence of a secret CIA detention 
program, defended CIA officials' use of 'alternative' interrogation methods, and called on 
Congress to pass proposed legislation on military commissions to try detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay" (Mertus 2008:75-6). 
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 (Mark Danner, We Are All Torturers Now, New York Times, Jan 6, 2005, at A27, quoted in (Ip 2009:39)). 
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 A second instance of exposure followed by overt affirmation of "forbidden practices" can 
be seen in the administration's reaction to the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Supreme Court decision, 
which ruled that the military commissions set up to try those held at the Guantanamo prison were 
illegal, and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. The 
Hamdan decision was issued on June 29, 2006.  Two months later, on "September 6, 2006, in a 
nationally televised address, President Bush acknowledged the existence of CIA black sites and 
WKHDXWKRUL]DWLRQRIZDWHUERDUGLQJDQGRWKHU³DOWHUQDWLYH´LQWHUURJDWLRQWDFWLFVZKLFKKH
FKDUDFWHUL]HGDV³WRXJK´³VDIH´³ODZIXO´DQG³QHFHVVDU\´(Hajjar 2011).  And the following 
month, the Military Commissions Act, which brought back the military commissions, and 
allowed the use of evidence and confessions gained via torture, was passed in Congress.  The 
Military Commissions Act "also amended the War Crimes Act to provide immunity for past 
violations of the Geneva Conventions by US officials dating back to 1997, and stripped the 
federal courts of jurisdiction over all prisoners detained in the FRQWH[WRIWKH³ZDURQWHUURU´
(Hajjar 2011). 
Analysis:  Why legalize torture? 
 Why did the Bush administration choose to govern terrorism through the law?  I argue 
that it was in response to the rise of the transnational human rights field, which, with its key 
practice of documentation and exposure of human rights violations, altered incentives for states, 
making denial, or complete cover-ups, less viable.  While the intent of human rights advocates in 
so doing was to eliminate human rights violations, an unforeseen consequence has been the 
opening up of new incentive structures, making not just open adherence to human rights norms, 
but also their open violation, more likely.  I thus argue that the "brazenness" of the Bush 
administration's use of torture in the war on terror should be understood as a response to the rise 
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of this transnational human rights field.  In this section I focus on two consequences of the rise of 
the human rights field: two ways in which the rise of human rights has altered the "field" of 
forces in which states act, and which shape their practices and strategic moves in the 
international arena.  First, state use of violence (both within and outside of formal "warfare") has 
become increasingly legalized (subject to legal regulation, justification, and 
contention/pushback).  Second,  the possibility and practicability of keeping large-scale state 
secrets has shifted, making denial a less feasible long term strategy.  These developments can be 
traced back over (at least) several decades-- concurrent with the rise of the human rights field.  
And while neither the legalization of warfare/state violence, nor the declining feasibility of state 
secrecy can been attributed solely to the rise of the transnational human rights field, the rise of 
human rights has had a significant effect on both of these transformations.  
The rise of a transnational human rights field   
 The latter half of the twentieth century and the early years of the 21st have seen the 
emergence of international law and legal expertise as spaces of contestation in which states, 
lawyers, human rights organizations and international institutions contest the legitimacy of states' 
use of violence against both citizens and foreigners (Keck, et al. 1998, Dezalay, et al. 2006).   
This field is transnational, but acts upon and through particular states and state and international 
and nongovernmental institutions.  And this field has a history, which entails the merging of 
several different fields of international law, including human rights law and the wars of law 
(which previously were largely separate).  What is this "transnational field of human rights," and 
where did it come from?   
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 When I write here of "fields," I draw primarily on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who 
developed the field analysis as a theoretical apparatus that could include both structure and 
agency in the same framework.  What is key about a "field" is that it is a space of "position-
takings" of various actors in relation to one another, with conflict a constant feature of these 
relations: "When we speak of a field of position-takings, we are insisting that what can be 
constituted as a system for the sake of analysis is not the product of a coherence-seeking 
intention or an objective consensus.  .  .  but the product and prize of a permanent  conflict;" 
(Bourdieu 1993:34).  More recently, Krause has described a field as "a realm in which actors 
take each other into account....a space of shared taken-for granteds  and interpretations, or, to use 
Pierre Bourdieu's term doxa," and suggests that we might ask "of any given space...is it fielded?" 
(Krause 2014:22).  Julian Go suggests that a global field is "an arena of struggle in which actors 
compete for a variety of valued resources, that is, different species of 'capital' that are potentially 
convertible to each other" and that "fields consist of two related but analytically separable 
dimensions: (1) the objective configuration of actor-positions and (2) the subjective meanings 
guiding actors in the struggle, that is the 'rules of the game'" (Go 2008:206).  I suggest that the 
transnational arena of human rights became "fielded" in the period between the 1970s and 1990s, 
thus coming to exert more potential influence on state action (although not necessarily 
determining the particular actions of any one state) during that time. 
 Histories of human rights differ in when they argue the concept emerged.  Although some  
suggest we can trace it all the way back to the eighteenth century (Hunt 2007), most locate the 
key turning point either to the aftermath of World War II and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Borgwardt 2007) or in the 1970s (Kelly 2012, Moyn 2012a, Keys 2014). For 
purposes of this article, I take the latter date to be the site of the key shift, with additional 
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important developments taking place in the 1980s and 1990s:  for while ideas about human 
rights maybe have begun to take shape earlier, it was not until the 1970s that the key elements of 
a transnational field of human rights, consisting of not just laws and treaties, but also significant 
numbers of governmental and non-governmental organizations (such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch), and institutional sites such as truth commissions and international 
courts, operating in relation to one another, began to take shape.  For in order for us to say that 
there is a field of human rights, there must be not just ideas, but also actors (individual and 
collective) who are oriented towards one another in their actions, with some of the 
aforementioned "ideas" taking the form of what is valued, or what underlies action, in the field. 
 Amnesty International, now one of the best known human rights organizations, was 
founded in 1961.  According to one account, while "The United Nations (UN) set down core 
human rights principles in 1948 in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human rights 
(UDHR)... the governmental representatives who made up the UN Commission on Human 
Rights ruled that it had no power to act .  .  .  since 1961, the entire context for international 
human rights discussions has changed.  In contrast to the weak human rights norms of the 1960s, 
it is now possible to point to the fruits of Amnesty's efforts  to build norms and elicit behavior 
more consistent with human rights principles"  (Clark 2001:3-4).  In sum, "When Amnesty was 
founded, an international 'human rights' regime, or complex of rules, as we now know it did not 
exist-- and there was no good reason to expect one"(Clark 2001:4).  In 1972, Amnesty launched 
the first worldwide "campaign for the abolition of torture" (Sikkink 2011:40).  Membership in 
national chapters grew quickly during this period, with the U.S. chapter growing from 3000 to 
50,000 between 1974 and 1976 (Sikkink 2011:41), while the NGO, Helsinki Watch, would 
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merge with a number of other regional groups to form Human Rights Watch in 1988, becoming 
"one of the world's largest and most influential human rights organizations" (Keys 2014:265).  
 Calls for the criminal prosecution of individual state leaders for human rights violations 
took off in the 1980s and 1990s.  In 1983, Argentinean activists began demanding trials of 
leaders who had engaged in human rights violations during the "Dirty War," and in 1998, 
Pinochet was extradited from London.  In 1990, Margaret Thatcher and George H W Bush 
endorsed the idea of a war crimes trial for Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait, and in 1991 
and 1992 there were calls for war crimes trials of leaders in the former Yugoslavia  (Sikkink 
2011:110).  In 1999, Slobodan Milosevic would become "the first sitting head of state to be 
indicted for war crimes", in 2003, Charles Taylor would become the second, and in 2009 Omar 
al Bashir the third (Sikkink 2011:4). 
 The rise of calls for individual accountability was in part a story about the bringing 
together of several previously separate fields of law: human rights law, humanitarian law/ the 
laws of war, and international criminal law (Sikkink 2011:100).   It was this new merger, 
beginning in the "discovery" and activation of the laws of war by human rights activists in the 
1980s, and cemented by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and then the International Criminal Court in 199822, that enabled the 
prosecution of individuals for human rights crimes (Sikkink 2011:106). 
 As the field developed, there came to be two core practices through which human rights 
advocates attempted to enforce norms.  These were, first, the use of documentation and exposure 
of human rights violations as a key form of "naming and shaming" human rights violators, and, 
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 The treaty entered into force, actually creating the ICC, in 2002. 
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second, the mobilization of law to hold states and individuals accountable.  As one account puts 
it, "(c)urrent debates about torture are saturated with law" (Kelly 2012:3).  Information collection 
and dissemination took on a central role in the practices of human rights advocates (Moon 
2012:876), aided by new technological developments: "It became possible to collect information 
about victims of repression abroad more cheaply, easily , and rapidly than before."  (Keys 
2014:10). As Moon (2012:876) puts it,  "The single most important activity that human rights 
organizations (HROs) undertake to promote human rights is that of documenting human rights 
violations."   This practice is foregrounded on an assumption that exposure of human rights 
violations will lead to their elimination:   that "if only people knew they would act" (Moon 
2012:877), with the "human rights report.  .  .  now firmly established as a liteUDU\JHQUHµZLWKLWV
RZQUXOHVRIVW\OHDQGSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶'XGDL(Moon 2012:877).   
 I argue that "naming and shaming": the documentation and dissemination of evidence of 
human rights violations, along with the rise of legal regulation and particularly prosecution, form 
key practices in the transnational human rights field.  And while neither of these practices have 
been able to compel states to change their relations to the norms of human rights, they have, I 
suggest, sufficiently shifted the forces at play in the international field so as to exert leverage on 
states' relational approach to human rights norms.  This relational approach should be 
conceptualized as including both concrete practices (do states violate human rights of individuals 
or not) as well as states' rhetoric (do states affirm rhetorically that they respect human rights).  
This is a somewhat different approach from those who would conceptualize "practices" and 
"discourses" as operating in distinct registers.  Further, this allows us to analyze practices and 
discourses together.   And while prior literature has largely focused on two relational modes 
(which I have earlier called "enlightenment" and "hypocrisy"), the case of the U.S. after 9/11 
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presents a third mode of state relation to human rights, which is what I have called 
"brazenness."23  My argument is that "brazenness" (like the other relational modes) is best 
understood as a strategic response to the shifting forces affecting states in the transnational 
human rights field:  in this case, the rise of "naming and shaming" along with legal remedies, 
which have acted to make "hypocrisy" a less viable option for states that wish to engage in 
torture.    
The "legalization" of torture as a response to the international human rights field 
 In this section, I draw on evidence from the published memoirs of participants in the 
Bush administration in support of this argument, demonstrating that these two shifts: the 
"legalization" of state violence, and the shifting feasibility of state secrecy, were on the minds of 
those who enacted the legal justification of torture, and, further, were often explicitly referenced 
when providing explanations for why torture was "legalized."  First, there was a sense of the 
seeming inevitability of the release of secrets, sometimes framed as a relatively new problem.  
Second, there was an awareness of the rising importance of law and lawyers as a constraint on 
state action, which, on the part of some actors, was joined with an interpretation of international 
law, and the international criminal court in particular, but also sometimes extending to 
international treaties and laws more generally, as "lawfare":  a form of war by other means.  
These themes were not present in every memoir, but there were also no instances of 
contradictory claims:  that is, none of the accounts claimed that law and lawyers had become less 
of a constraint on state action, nor did any of  the accounts presume that secrets could easily and 
indefinitely be kept. 
                                                          
23
 The U.S. after 9/11 is not the only case in which the relational mode of brazenness has occurred: earlier cases 
would included the UK and Israel, at certain points in time.   In other work I will explore the relations between these 
cases, although this paper focuses solely on the U.S. case. 
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 The first recurring theme in the memoirs is the seeming  inevitability of the release of 
secrets.  In his memoir, Decision Points, former President G.W. Bush wrote, on his decision to 
approve the use of "controversial" interrogation techniques, that:   
 I knew that an interrogation program this sensitive and controversial would one day 
 become public.  .  .  I would have preferred that we get the information  another way.  
 But the choice between security and values was real.  .  .  I approved the  use of the 
 interrogation techniques (Bush 2010:169).   
While John Kiriakou, a CIA analyst now best known for being first official in the US 
government to confirm the use of waterboarding, wrote that: "Even though enhanced techniques 
were supposed to be used only on the highest-profile, toughest, most important al-Qaeda 
prisoners, word of their existence got out pretty quickly" (Kiriakou and (with Michael Ruby) 
2009:140).  And later, when discussing his acknowledgement that Abu Zubaydah had been 
waterboarded, noted that: 
 President Bush had talked about the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on al-
 Qaeda prisoners, although he and others in the administration had never addressed the 
 specifics.  At that point, the torture memos were classified  .  .  .  Still, Human Rights 
 Watch and other nongovernmental organizations had been saying for more than two years 
 that waterboarding was one of the enhanced techniques; if it was a secret.  .  .  it was the 
 worst-kept secret in Washington by December 2007 (Kiriakou, et al. 2009:187). 
What all of these excerpts indicate are a shared awareness of the fleeting nature of secrets, and 
possible dangers of attempting to conceal information that would likely become public after a 
time.    
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 Second, was an awareness of the increased importance of law/ lawyers as a constraint on 
governments.  Donald Rumsfeld, who served as Secretary of Defense under President Bush, 
writes in his memoir that: 
 One of the notable changes I had observed from my service in the Pentagon in the 1970s 
 was the prevalence of lawyers  .  .  .  By the time I returned as secretary in 2001, there 
 were a breathtaking ten thousand lawyers.  .  .  involved at nearly every level of the chain 
 of command (Rumsfeld 2011:557). 
While General Richard Myers, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under 
President Bush from 2001-2005, observed at a meeting to discuss the question of interrogation 
practices that, "I noted the government attorneys sitting along the walls behind each of their 
principals" (Myers and with Malcolm McConnell 2009:205).  
 A related, and perhaps even more important, theme that emerges from the memoirs is the 
rise of a shared perception of  international law as "lawfare": a harnessing of legal strategies to 
wage war by other means, which must therefore be resisted.24  On law as "lawfare," Donald 
Rumsfeld writes: 
 Besides contending with enemy bullets and bombs, the men and women in our nation's 
 military and intelligence services must also navigate legal traps set by our enemies, by 
 some of our fellow citizens, by some foreigners, and even by some members of Congress 
 and officials at international institutions such as the United  Nations.  .  .  This is a new 
 kind of asymmetric war waged by our enemies-- 'lawfare' (Rumsfeld 2011:595). 
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 The concept of "lawfare" first took hold in American military discourse in 2001, when "a prominent US military 
lawyer proposed the neologism 'lawfare', which he defined as 'the use of law as a weapon of war'" (Jones 2015). 
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Like several others, Rumsfeld points to the experiences of Henry Kissinger, who was facing 
threats of prosecution in the early 2000s, as well as the naming of General Tommy Franks in a 
lawsuit before a Belgian court in 2003, as a crucial turning point in his consciousness of the 
threat (Rumsfeld 2011:596).25   Nor was the danger of "lawfare" limited to those in high 
positions:  the International Criminal Court was, in 2003, "being discussed as a possible forum to 
try U.S. military and civilian personnel involved in the Iraq war" (Rumsfeld 2011:598). 
 In John Yoo's account of his time in the Office of Legal Counsel from 2001-2003, three 
themes leap out:  a view of law/lawyers as the enemy, and law and the courts as a battlefield; a 
view of the period preceding 9/11 as excessively legally regulated, so much so that it impeded 
national security; and a view of law itself, consequently, as a necessary defense against these 
constraints.  Yoo repeatedly portrays the law itself as a site of conflict:  e.g. "The group of us 
who landed that day in Cuba surely had no idea then that the front in the war on terrorism would 
soon move from the battlefields of Afghanistan to the cells of Gitmo and the federal 
courtrooms." (Yoo 2006:20); and lawyers as the enemy to be overtaken: e.g. "Human rights 
lawyers, law professors, and activists who oppose the war on terror"  who "have filed many 
lawsuits" (Yoo 2006:129).  The pre-9/11 period is portrayed as a hyper-regulated era in which an 
abundance of caution prevented any effective action against al-Qaeda:  "Efforts to capture or kill 
al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden throughout the 1990s were shelved, out of concerns that the 
Justice Department did not have enough evidence to satisfy the legal standard for a criminal 
arrest.  A return to this state of affairs would be a huge mistake" (Yoo 2006:3). The legal 
restraint on counter-terrorism is presented by Yoo as a serious constraint, necessitating a legal 
counteroffensive to permit effective counter-terrorism action.  
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 Rumsfeld then notes that after Belgium asserted universal jurisdiction and Franks was named in the lawsuit, he 
threatened to move NATO's headquarters, and "the Belgian government repealed their law" (Rumsfeld 2011:598). 
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 In the memoir of Jack Goldsmith, head of the Office of Legal Counsel from fall 2003, 
until he resigned in July 2004, law is also viewed as an encumbrance upon the proper 
functioning of the state.  Goldsmith argues, first, that the U.S. has been subject to a rising 
legalization of warfare over the course of the twentieth century (encompassing both domestic 
and international legal regulation), and second, that these pressure particularly mounted at the 
end of the twentieth century and the start of the 21st, leading to heightened concerned about 
prosecution among both government officials and military and intelligence operatives.  The 
response to this was either, a cowed executive (exemplified by the Clinton administration) or the 
attempt to provide legal cover as a countermeasure to this expanded legalization of warfare 
(exemplified by the administration of G. W. Bush).  Goldsmith argues that there was a shift from 
law as a 'political' constraint on political power (in the early 20th century) to a "judicial" 
constraint on political power in the late 20th/early 21st: "When <FDR> considered bending the 
law, he did not worry about being sued or prosecuted.  .  .  He worried instead about the reaction 
of the press, the Congress, and most of all, the American people" (Goldsmith 2007:49).   The 
Bush administration, however, faced "obstacles" in form of both domestic and international laws 
that had come to regulate the conduct of warfare, particularly since the Vietnam War (Goldsmith 
2007:23).   Given this, the Bush administration acted in a context when "government officials 
seriously worried that their heat-of-battle judgment calls would result in prosecution by 
independent counsels, Justice Departments of future administrations, or foreign or international 
courts" (Goldsmith 2007:12). 
 Goldsmith details what he calls a "criminalization of war," starting with the War Powers 
Act of the 1970s, and specific restrictions on the intelligence agencies in the 1970s and 80s, and 
the Torture Statute of 1994, which "provides for criminal sanctions, including the death penalty, 
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for perpetrators of torture" (Pfiffner 2010:119) passed by the U.S. following the adoption of the 
UN Convention Against Torture (Goldsmith 2007:66).  This legalization of warfare was 
evidenced, and "reinforced" by  "the swarm of lawyers that rose up in the military and 
intelligence establishment to interpret multiplying laws and provide cover for those asked to act 
close to the legal line (Goldsmith 2007:91).  Whereas the CIA employed only a small number of 
lawyers in the 1970s, by 2007 they had over one hundred, while lawyers in the Department of 
Defense number over ten thousand (Goldsmith 2007:91).26  And this was the scene which set the 
stage for the Bush administration's response to the attacks of 9/11/2001.  
 Inside the Pentagon, this situation had begun to be conceptualized as "lawfare":  not just a 
neutral regulation of war by law, but a vision of law as a tool to be mobilized by the enemy. 
"Lawfare," Goldsmith writes, "is 'the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve an operational objective,' according to Air Force Brigadier 
General Charles Dunlap, who popularized the phrase.  Enemies like al Qaeda who cannot match 
the United States militarily instead criticize it for purported legal violations, especially violations 
of human rights or the laws of war" (Goldsmith 2007:58).  These fears rose with the 
implementation of "universal jurisdiction" in the 1980s and 90s, and came to a head with the 
formation of the International Criminal Court in 2002.27  The 2005 National Defense Strategy of 
the United States presented lawfare as an official threat, declaring that "our strength as a nation 
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 On this "legalization" of the Department of Defense, see also Ansorge (cite).  
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 "The enforcement gap finally began to close with the development of the idea of universal jurisdiction.  ..  .  The 
idea had been kicking around in human rights circles since World War II but got a big boost with two important 
events in the 1980s.  The first was a 1980 case in New York called Filartiga, which allowed a Paraguayan citizen to 
sue a Paraguayan official who tortured his son in Paraguay.  .  .  The second boost for universal jurisdiction came 
when Baltasar Garzon, a Spanish magistrate, began to investigate the South American dirty wars of the 1970s .  .  .  
The House of Lords, in a landmark decision, ruled that universal jurisdiction was a valid concept, and that England 
must hand Pinochet over to Spain....Sovereign immunity no longer stood as a roadblock to trials of government 
officials for gross human rights violations" (Goldsmith 2007:55-56). (See also Sikkink (2011).) 
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state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using 
international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism" (Goldsmith 2007:53).   
 These developments led to fears both among individual government officials and the 
military and intelligence services.  Goldsmith reports that former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger became extremely "rattled" by the extradition of Pinochet and threats that he too would 
be brought up on human rights charges (Goldsmith 2007:57).  In 2002, as various groups called 
for Kissinger to be charged with war crimes, "he decided to call an old friend from his 
government days, Gerald Ford's Chief of Staff and the current Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld" (Goldsmith 2007:58).  In Goldsmith's view, however, the main impetus for the 
development of  legal infrastructure for torture was not the concerns of senior officials, but 
rather, "a paralyzing culture of risk-averse legalism in the military and, especially, intelligence 
establishments" (Goldsmith 2007:94). 
 Other accounts of the war on terror are also replete with examples of just such demands 
for cover (e.g. Pfiffner 2010).  In sum, there is evidence that what I have called the "legalization" 
of torture, or the development of an explicit, quasi-open legal infrastructure to defend its use, 
should be understood as resulting from responses to the rise of a transnational field of human 
rights.  In order to appease the military and intelligence sector, as well as fears of top officials, 
the Bush administration paved the way for an explicit defense of practices that in the past might 
have been undertaken covertly, a strategy which while perhaps seeming more rational on its face, 
opened all those involved to personal retribution should their actions be exposed.  The strategy of 
legalization and quasi-openness, in contrast, provides a preemptive defense against such attacks.   
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 On reading the accounts of insiders within the Bush administration writing of their 
experiences of the first years on the war on terror, what first becomes apparent is the 
intentionality of what I am calling the "legalization" of torture- that is, its inscription into legal 
documents and regulations.  Jack Goldsmith describes travelling to Guantanamo on what he 
terms a "plane full of lawyers,"28 and his account emphasizes the central role of legal expertise in 
the war on terror.  His memoir of that year emphasizes the extent to which the president and his 
staff felt constrained by the rise of an apparatus of both domestic and international law 
governing human rights and the government use of force, and yet this constraint did not lead 
them to bend their actions and rhetoric to comply with international law, but instead, to argue 
that international law should be redefined to fit with their actions.  Goldsmith writes that 
"President Bush acted in an era in which many aspects of presidential war power had become 
encumbered by elaborate criminal restrictions, and in which government officials seriously 
worried that their heat-of-battle judgment calls would result in prosecution by independent 
counsels, Justice Departments of future administrations, or foreign or international courts."29   
 It was thus, in the view of the Bush White House, the very rise of the legal apparatus 
enforcing human rights and the laws of war that led them to develop an explicit legal apparatus 
in defense of (what they generally did not refer to, but others did, as) "torture."  In other words, 
the relative "openness" of the state with regard to torture30 should be seen not as a bizarre 
aberration, but as a calculated move on the part of a government which chose to use "forbidden 
practices," and which saw secrecy and denial as less plausible defenses than they had been in the 
                                                          
28
 "Perhaps the oddest thing about my fortieth-birthday trip to GTMO and the naval brigs was that the plane was full 
of lawyers" (Goldsmith 2007:129) 
29
 Goldsmith: p12. 
30
 (And while I have here focused on the justification of torture under the Bush administration, but would argue that 
while the subsequent Obama administration has moved back from the defense of torture, it has enacted similar 
strategies with regard to its use, and open defense of, assassination (particularly via drone warfare)) 
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past, as a result of the rise of a moral, legal, and institutional apparatus which aimed to root out 
and punish such hypocrisy.  Accounts of those directly involved suggest that they were acting in 
response to two, related states of affairs:  first, the broader legalization (legal regulation )of 
warfare which had occurred in the U.S. since the 1970s, and the (subsequent) emergence of 
"demands for cover" from the military and intelligence sectors.  
Conclusion 
 This paper began with the puzzle of why the U.S. war on terror has been characterized by 
a brazen rejection of international human rights norms, rather than, as might be expected, a 
strategy of either compliance or hypocrisy.  I have argued that rather than a paradox, this move 
should actually be understood as a strategic state response to the rise of an international field of 
transnational human rights regulation.  Within a theoretical framework which situates human 
rights norms, and practices such as documentation, exposure, and prosecution as key practices of 
human rights advocates within a transnational field, it is possible to understand how and why the 
forces acting upon states might have shifted so as to make "brazenness" and legal justification of 
torture and other human rights violations a strategic move for the United States after 9/11.   
 A transnational fields framework has greater explanatory power as compared to alternate 
analytic approaches.   Constructivist IR theories, as well as sociological world-society theories 
both tend to presume that norms will take on greater power over time, and fail to predict that 
powerful states might choose to openly resist such norms.  Realist approaches, meanwhile, tend 
to ignore the importance of culture and norms overall, finding the cultural realm insignificant.  
This approach also improves upon earlier constructivist approaches to the study of norms in IR, 
which tended to lack a theory of agency ((Checkel 1998), cited in (Scheipers 2015)).   
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 By conceptualizing states as operating within a transnational field, together with other 
state and non-state actors, the approach put forth in this paper avoids the teleological 
assumptions of these alternate frameworks, while allowing us to better analyze the multi-
directional impact of transnational actors upon states, and vice versa.  Such an approach allows 
us to better analyze seemingly puzzling developments, such as the "legalization" of human rights 
violations, as strategies, which bring together both rhetoric and practice.   By conceptualizing 
state action as strategic moves within a transnational field, we move beyond a conception of such 
activities as simply "norm violations" and can understand the gains states might obtain from such 
actions, as well as the broader contexts which make such gains possible.   
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